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Abstract—The emergence of novel wireless networking
paradigms such as small cell and cognitive radio networks has
forever transformed the way in which wireless systems are
operated. In particular, the need for self-organizing solutions
to manage the scarce spectral resources has become a prevalent
theme in many emerging wireless systems. In this paper, the first
comprehensive tutorial on the use of matching theory, a Nobel-
prize winning framework, for resource management in wireless
networks is developed. To cater for the unique features of emerg-
ing wireless networks, a novel, wireless-oriented classification of
matching theory is proposed. Then, the key solution concepts
and algorithmic implementations of this framework are exposed.
Then, the developed concepts are applied in three important
wireless networking areas in order to demonstrate the usefulness
of this analytical tool. Results show how matching theory can
effectively improve the performance of resource allocation in all
three applications discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smartphones, tablets, and other handheld devices are ex-
ponentially increasing the traffic load in current wireless net-
works. To meet this increasing demand, several new paradigms
have emerged such as: a) cognitive radio (CR) networks,
in which cognitive devices can adaptively opportunistically
access the wireless spectrum thus improving spectral utiliza-
tion, b) small cell networks that boost wireless capacity and
coverage via a viral deployment of low-cost small cell base
stations, and c) large-scale device-to-device communications
that can occur over both cellular and unlicensed bands. This
is gradually leading to a future, multi-tiered heterogeneous
wireless architecture, as seen in Fig. 1.
Effectively managing resource allocation in such a com-
plex environment warrants a fundamental shift from tradi-
tional centralized mechanisms toward self-organizing and self-
optimizing approaches. The need for this shift is motivated
by practical factors such as the increasing density of wireless
networks and the need for communications with low latency.
Even recent emerging centralized paradigms such as cloud-
based RAN will still require some form of self-organization
due to country-specific backhaul constraints. In consequence,
there is a need for self-organizing systems in which small cell
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Fig. 1: A future wireless network with a mixture of small cells,
cognitive radio devices, and heterogeneous spectrum bands.
base stations and even devices can have some intelligence to
rapidly make resource management decisions.
Indeed, there has been a recent surge in literature that
proposes new mathematical tools for optimizing resource allo-
cation in many emerging wireless systems. Examples include
centralized optimization and game theory. Centralized opti-
mization techniques can provide optimal solutions to resource
allocation problems and their algorithmic implementations
have matured over the past few years. However, they often
require global network information and centralized control
thus yielding significant overhead and complexity. This com-
plexity can rapidly increase when dealing with combinatorial,
integer programming problems such as channel allocation
and user association. Moreover, centralized optimization may
not be able to properly handle the challenges of dense and
heterogeneous wireless environments such as in Fig. 1.
The aforementioned limitations of optimization have led
to an interesting body of literature that deals with the use
of noncooperative game theory for wireless resource alloca-
tion [1]. Despite their potential, such approaches present some
shortcomings. First, classical game-theoretic algorithms such
as best response will require some form of knowledge on other
players’ actions, thus limiting their distributed implementation.
Second, most game-theoretic solutions, such as the Nash equi-
librium, investigate one-sided (or unilateral) stability notions
in which equilibrium deviations are evaluated unilaterally per
player. Such unilateral deviations may not be practical when
investigating assignment problems between distinct sets of
players. Last, but not least, the tractability of equilibria in
game-theoretic methods requires having some structure in the
objective functions which for practical wireless metrics may
not always be satisfied.
Recently, matching theory has emerged as a promising
technique for wireless resource allocation which can overcome
some limitations of game theory and optimization [2]–[6].
Matching theory is a Nobel-prize winning framework that
provides mathematically tractable solutions for the combina-
torial problem of matching players in two distinct sets [7]–
[9], depending on the individual information and preference of
each player. The advantages of matching theory for wireless
resource management include: 1) suitable models for char-
acterizing interactions between heterogeneous nodes, each of
which has its own type, objective, and information, 2) ability
to define general “preferences” that can handle heterogeneous
and complex considerations related to wireless quality-of-
service (QoS), 3) suitable solutions, in terms of stability and
optimality, that accurately reflect different system objectives,
and 4) efficient algorithmic implementations that are inherently
self-organizing and amenable to fast implementation.
However, reaping the benefits of matching theory for wire-
less networks requires advancing this framework to handle
their intrinsic properties such as interference and delay. De-
spite the surge in research that applies matching theory for
wireless, most existing works are restricted to very limited
aspects of resource allocation. This is mainly due to the
sparsity of tutorials that tackle matching theory from an
engineering perspective. For instance, most references such
as [7]–[9] focus on matching problems in microeconomics. In
addition, although [10] provides an interesting introduction to
matching theory for engineering, it does not explicitly explore
the challenges of future wireless systems.
In this tutorial, we aim to provide a unified treatment of
matching theory oriented towards engineering applications,
in general, and wireless networking, in particular. The goal
is to gather the state-of-the-art contributions that address
the major opportunities and challenges in applying matching
theory to the understanding of emerging wireless networks,
with emphasis on both new analytical techniques and novel
application scenarios. Beyond providing a self-contained tuto-
rial on classical matching concepts, we will introduce a new
classification that is oriented towards next-generation wireless
systems. For each class of matching problems, we provide the
basic challenges, solution concepts, and potential applications.
Then, we conclude by summarizing the potential of matching
theory as a tool for resource management in wireless networks.
II. MATCHING THEORY: FUNDAMENTALS AND
CONVENTIONAL CLASSIFICATION
A. Basic Matching Definitions
The basic wireless resource management problem can be
posed as a matching problem between resources and users.
Depending on the scenario, the resources can be of different
abstraction levels, representing base stations, time-frequency
chunks, power, or others. Users can be devices, stations,
or smartphone applications. Each user and resource has a
quota that defines the maximum number of players with
which it can be matched. The main goal of matching is to
optimally match resources and users, given their individual,
often different objectives and learned information. Each user
(resource) builds a ranking of the resources (users) using a
preference relation. The concept of a preference represents
the individual view that each resource or user has on the
other set, based on local information. In its basic form, a
preference can simply be defined in terms of an objective
utility function that quantifies the QoS achieved by a certain
resource-user matching. However, a preference is more generic
than a utility function in that it can incorporate additional
qualitative measures extracted from the information available
to users and resources.
A matching is essentially an allocation between resources
and users. The basic solution concept for a matching problem
is the so-called two-sided stable matching. A matching is said
to be two-sided stable, if and only if there is no blocking pair
(BP). A BP for a stable marriage case is defined as a pair of
user and resource (u, r), where u prefers r to its currently
matched user j, and r prefers u to its currently matched
resource k. Thus, u will leave i to be matched to r and r would
prefer being matched to user u than user k. The implication
of stability in a wireless network will be further discussed
in Section III-B. This definition of stability can extend to all
types of matching problems.
B. Conventional Classification
The classical classification of matching problems is based
on the values of the player quotas as follows:
• One-to-one matching: Each player can be matched to at
most one member of the opposite set. The most prominent
example is the stable marriage problem in which men and
women need to be matched for marriage.
• Many-to-one matching: Here, in one of the sets, at least
one player can be matched to multiple players of the
opposing set, while in the other set, every player has
exactly one match. One example is the college admissions
problem in which one student can be matched to one
university while a university can recruit multiple students.
• Many-to-many matching: At least one player within each
of the two sets could be matched to more than one
member in the other set. Many-to-many matching is
the most general type of problems and it admits many
examples such as creating partnerships in peer-to-peer
networks.
There exists other classifications for matching problems,
such as based on the partitioning of players, and the preference
requirement for players. However, such classes can be often
derived as special cases of the above matching problems.
C. Basic Algorithmic Solution: Deferred Acceptance
The seminal result in matching theory shows that at least
one stable matching exists for general preferences in con-
ventional one-to-one and one-to-many games [11]. This work
also introduced an efficient algorithm, known as the deferred
acceptance (DA) algorithm (polynomial time for one-to-one
and empirically very fast for one-to-many) which can find
such a matching. DA is an iterative procedure, shown in Fig.
Initialize:
Users’ preference lists (PLs);
Resources’ PLs;
Propose:
Each user proposes to its most favorite 
resource; and delete it from its PL;
Check:
If all users’ PLs are empty?
Accept/reject:
Each resource keeps the most favorite users 
regarding its quota and PL among the proposals; 
and reject the rest;
Check:
If all users are matched?
Terminate:
A stable matching between 
users and resources.
No
Yes Yes
No
Fig. 2: Deferred acceptance algorithm.
2, in which players in one set make proposals to the other
set, whose players, in turn, decide to accept or reject these
proposals, respecting their quota. Users and resources make
their decisions based on their individual preferences (e.g.,
available information or QoS metric). This process admits
many distributed implementations which do not require the
players to know each other’s preferences [11]. When the
preferences are strict (no indifference), the stable matching is
also Pareto optimal for the proposing players [11]. Extensions
that balance the roles of proposing and receiving players or
which handle many-to-many cases have been developed such
as in [10] and [12].
From an information exchange point of view, even though
DA requires players to submit proposals to one another, it does
not require a centralized controller. During the information
exchange (proposals), each player is required to only collect
information on the players they are interested in from the
opposite set to perform a ranking according to its preferences.
The players need not observe the actions or preferences of
other players. After building preference lists, the players take
actions based on the local information they collected without
requiring any synchronization in time. The convergence of DA
to a stable matching is guaranteed irrespective of the order of
play and without any synchronization. Therefore, a DA-based
approach can be implemented in a distributed manner without
requiring a central information collection center. For such
distributed implementations, the results on the polynomial
time convergence of one-to-one matching would still hold as
corroborated by some recent studies [3], [13]
III. MATCHING IN WIRELESS NETWORKS:
FUNDAMENTALS
A. Wireless-Oriented Classification
To capture the various wireless resource management fea-
tures, we condense the rich matching literature into three new,
proposed classes of problems, illustrated in Fig. 3, and having
the following properties:
1) Class I: Canonical matching: This constitutes the base-
line class in which the preference of any resource (user)
depends solely on the information available at this re-
source (user) and on the users (resources) to which it is
seeking to match. This is useful to study resource man-
agement within a single cell or for allocating orthogonal
spectrum resources. This is particularly applicable, for
example, to CR networks, in which one must allocate
orthogonal, licensed channels to a number of unlicensed
users.
2) Class II: Matching with externalities: This class allows
finding desirable matchings when the problem exhibits
“externalities” which translate into interdependencies be-
tween the players’ preferences. For example, in a small
cell network, whenever a user is associated to a resource,
the preference of other users will automatically change,
since this allocated resource can create interference at
other resources using the same frequency. Thus, the
preferences of any player depend not only on the in-
formation available at this player, but also on the entire
matching of the others. We distinguish between two
types of externalities: conventional externalities and peer
effects. In the former, the dependence of the preferences
is between players matched to different players in the
other set, such as in the interference example. In the latter,
the preference of a user on a resource will depend on the
identity and number of other users that are matched to
the same resource. Such peer effects are abundant in a
wireless environment due to factors such as delay.
3) Class III: Matching with dynamics: The third class,
matching with dynamics, is suitable for scenarios in
which one must adapt the matching processes to dynam-
ics of the environment such as fast fading, mobility, or
time-varying traffic. Here, at each time, the preferences
of the players might change and, thus, the time dimension
must be accounted for in the matching solution. However,
for a given time, the matching problem can be of either
class I or class II.
Mathematically, the formulation of problems in all three
classes will follow the basics of Section II. For class I, the
preferences of one player set simply depend on the other
player set. However, for class II, the preferences will now
depend not only on the matched user, but also on the entire
matching, due to externalities. For class III, one can introduce
a time-dependent state variable in the matching. Subsequently,
the preferences will now be time and state dependent, if the
problem has both dynamics and externalities. The transition
between states depends on the application being studied. For
example, if the state represents the activity pattern of a licensed
user, the transition would follow a classical Markov model.
In contrast, if the state represents a dynamically varying fast
fading channel, one can use differential equations to represent
the state transition.
B. Matching Theory in Wireless: Discussions
In wireless resource management, the matching stability no-
tion discussed in Section II-A implies robustness to deviations
that can benefit both the resource owners and the users. In
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orthogonal spectrum in cognitive radio 
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Fig. 3: Novel, wireless-oriented classification of matching theory.
fact, an unstable matching can for example lead to undesirable
cases in which a base station can swap its least preferred
user with another since this swap is beneficial to both the
resource and the user. Having such network-wide deviations
ultimately leads to an unstable network operation. Remarkably,
a recent result [2] has shown that classical schemes such as
proportional fair often yield unstable matchings, which further
motivates the need to analyze and optimize stable matchings
for self-organizing wireless systems. This concept is very
useful in matching problems and is broadly applicable to all
classes 1.
While the existence of a stable matching is guaranteed for
canonical games in the one-to-one and one-to-many cases,
such results do not readily map to many-to-many nor to
classes II and III. However, although DA and its variants were
originally conceived for canonical matching, one can also use
them as the nexus of new matching algorithms, tailored to
the nature of wireless networks. Such algorithms can be used
to establish existence of stable matchings for classes II and
II as well as for finding outcomes with desirable efficiency
properties.
Here, we note that no general existence result for sta-
ble matching with externalities exists. However, to handle
externalities, one can utilize an iterative DA process which
continuously updates the preferences based on the currently
perceived matching. By exploiting the structure of externalities
via wireless concepts such as interference graphs (e.g., who
interferes with whom), one can analyze the convergence and
stability of the resulting matching. Naturally, by building on
such methods one can expand the realm of matching theory
to handle externalities. Similarly, by integrating notions from
stochastic games into matching, practical, dynamic algorithms
can be devised, to find matchings that can cope with time-
1This concept can also be connected to other stronger or weaker stability
notions (e.g., setwise or Nash stability) which have various interpretations.
varying changes and are stable over time. The basic idea is
to cast the matching problem as a stochastic game and, then,
explore the rich literature on dynamic game theory [1] to solve
this problem while ensuring that the solution will converge
to a two-sided stable matching rather than a classical Nash
equilibrium. The solution would now essentially be a dynamic
and stochastic version of DA.
Although the above discussed matching solutions could
provide stable matchings, they also have some limitations:
1) Similar to game theory, matching problems can admit
multiple stable solutions and, thus, the selection of a desirable
matching is a key design issue, 2) the optimality of the stable
solution may not be always guaranteed, however, one can
utilize known techniques, such as pricing or optimized utility
designs, to drive the matching solution towards an optimal and
stable point, 3) the exchange of proposals during DA requires
additional signaling in a wireless network, however, one can
exploit some structure of the problem to reduce the number
of proposals as done in [3].
IV. MATCHING THEORY IN WIRELESS NETWORKS:
APPLICATIONS
A. Cognitive Radio Networks
Cognitive radio networks present a primary application of
matching theory due to: 1) necessity of decentralized oper-
ation, 2) need for dynamic spectrum access which requires
efficient resource management solutions, and 3) the two-sided
nature of CR in which licensed, primary users (PUs) own the
channels that must be accessed by the unlicensed, secondary
users (SUs). Indeed, in CR networks, centralized optimization
solutions are undesirable since PUs and SUs often belong to
different operators and cannot be centrally controlled. On the
other hand, in some CR problems, such as PU-SU association,
using a noncooperative game can lead to stable solutions in
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Number of SUs, M
Su
m
 o
f S
Us
’ r
at
es
, b
its
/s
/H
z
 
 
Random channel allocation (3 PUs)
Deferred acceptance algorithm (3 PUs)
Proposed algorithm (3 PUs)
Random channel allocation (4 PUs)
Deferred acceptance algorithm (4 PUs)
Proposed algorithm (4 PUs)
Fig. 4: Example result showing how matching improves
channel allocation in cognitive radio networks.
which matching PUs and SUs is done without requiring the
two-sided consent of both PUs and SUs.
The suitability of matching theory for CR has been corrob-
orated by a number of recent works such as [3] and [4]. In
particular, [3] presented one of the first works in this area.
In this work, a one-to-one matching problem is formulated
between a number of SUs and a number of PUs (channels).
The channels are assumed to be orthogonal and, thus, the game
is a canonical matching game. The preferences of both users
and channels are based on the same utility function which
primarily captures the rate of transmission. Under this model,
it is shown that: a) a unique stable matching exists and b) a
modified version of the DA algorithm can be used to find the
stable allocation in a time efficient manner. This work was
extended in [4] to account for energy efficiency.
Recently, we also studied a one-to-one matching problem
between SUs and PUs in which the SUs rank the PUs based
on their confidence in sensing the PUs’ channels. In particular,
using a soft-decision Bayesian framework, we quantified the
accuracy of the sensing of each channel and we incorporated
this metric in the SUs preferences. Prior to matching, each
SU evaluates its appreciation of the PU channel by capturing
the effect of confidence in sensing as well as rate. Then,
the PUs actively participate in the association process based
on two cases: a) when inactive, the PU prefers to grant its
band to the SU with the highest sensing detection and rate
to better exploit the channel and b) when active, the PU
prefers to protect its band, and, thus, will attempt to limit
or deny association. Here, we show that the matching is
canonical and we adopt a modified DA algorithm that allows
the PUs to handle the aforementioned property. As shown in
Fig. 4, for the studied scenario, the matching-based algorithm
yields significant performance gains, in terms of the SUs sum-
rate, when compared to classical, random channel allocation
schemes. Moreover, the modified DA algorithm also presents
sum-rate improvements over classical DA (similar gains can
be seen in terms of convergence time).
Clearly, CR networks present an important avenue for
matching theory. Many extensions to the existing works can
be envisioned, particularly by exploring matching with exter-
nalities (under interference constraints) and dynamic matching
(given time-varying PU activity).
B. Heterogeneous Small Cell-based Networks
Heterogeneous small cell-based wireless networks (Het-
Nets) present an important application of matching theory
due to their heterogeneity and scale. Also, there has been
an increased recent interest in developing context-aware or
user-centric HetNets that can exploit new dimensions such as
social metrics to improve resource allocation. Such context-
awareness further motivates the need for distributed solutions
that account for the individual context available at each node
– similar to how matching captures individual preferences.
Given this striking analogy between matching theory and
resource management in HetNets, the proposed classes can
be used to address a variety of problems that include: inter-
ference management, handover management, caching, and cell
association.
Here, matching is preferred over optimization due to: 1) the
density and scale of HetNets which motivate self-organizing
solutions, 2) need to account for the context present at each
SBS and device instead of a single, global utility function,
and 3) the centralized optimization approach will generally
yield a combinatorial problem, particularly, in the presence
of heterogeneous context, which limits its applicability here.
Moreover, although a noncooperative game is also applicable
here, it will have a number of limitations that include the need
to observe (at least partially) all players preferences and the
fact that the solution concepts would not account for two-sided
stability as previously explained.
In [14], we studied the problem of cell association in the
uplink of a HetNet. The basic model here is an uplink HetNet
model in which each user needs to decide on which small
cell base station (SBS) to be assigned to. The problem is
formulated as a one-to-many matching model in which a user
can be associated with only one small cell base station (SCBS)
and an SCBS can admit a certain quota of users. The users’
preferences over SBSs capture the bit error rate and delay
tradeoff that they can achieve while the SBSs’ preferences
favor load balancing by pushing users to the smaller cells,
without jeopardizing QoS. Such a load balancing is essentially
a form of cell biasing in which an SBS would offload some
users from the macrocell and service them directly. Here, we
also consider the delay at each SBS due to the increasing load
and the limited capacity of the backhaul that connects the SBS’
to the core network. Therefore, although orthogonal spectrum
is considered, due to the delay, the matching problem is shown
to have peer effects and, thus, it belongs to class II, matching
with externalities.
Due to peer effects, applying DA and its variants will
not yield a stable matching. Instead, we developed a new
algorithm that starts with a distributed DA-based process using
initial preferences based on the worst-case delay. Then, as
the nodes measure externalities, they modify their preferences
and change their choices by transferring to other SBSs. Then,
we show that, due to the presence of transfers in the model,
the delay sensitive users will tradeoff two-sided stability for
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Fig. 5: Example result showing how matching theory can be
used to improve uplink cell association in HetNets.
a weaker stability which achieves a better quality-of-service.
Fig. 5 shows simulation results for 2 macrocells and 10 SBSs.
We can see that the matching-based approach outperforms
the benchmark best neighbor scheme that is often adopted
in classical cellular systems, with up to 23% of improvement
in the average user utility. Fig. 5 also shows a reasonable
convergence time that grows slowly with the network size.
One can extend this framework of matching with peer
effects or, more generally, externalities to many other areas
in HetNets. For example, in [5], the framework is extended to
account for interference and perform downlink cell association
for a context-aware network in which preferences capture a
palette of information that include application type, hardware
size, and physical layer metrics. In addition, as shown in in
[13], one can explore canonical matching models to study, not
only the association at the radio level, but also at the level of
operators.
In a nutshell, matching-theoretic models, in all three classes,
can serve as a fundamental analytical tool for future cellular
systems. Beyond the examples discussed above, one can
envision several new models such as many-to-many matching
models for caching, dynamic matching models for handling
mobility, and stochastic matching models that smartly combine
matching with stochastic geometry.
C. Device-to-Device Communications
One promising technology to overcome the ever-increasing
wireless capacity crunch is device-to-device (D2D) communi-
cations. Using D2D, mobile users can communicate directly
over cellular spectrum bands while bypassing the base sta-
tions (BSs). As D2D users may share spectral bands with one
another as well as with the cellular network, the introduction of
D2D in cellular networks will lead to new challenges in terms
of interference management and resource allocation. Thus, it
will provide an important application for matching theory.
Optimizing resources for D2D communication using cen-
tralized optimization can result in more overhead due to
information exchange and centralized computation. In partic-
ular, centralized optimization will require not only dynamic
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information collection at the BS from all possible D2D pairs
but will also need to deal with an increased computation
complexity at the BS level. Formulating the D2D problem
as a noncooperative game will be limited by the fact that it
will still rely on individual stability and the need for D2D
users to observe the preferences of other players. To counter
these limitations, it is of interest to develop matching-theoretic
models for D2D communications. To this end, we observe
that D2D typically involves two types of users: cellular users
(CUs) and D2D users (DUs). In the underlay mode of D2D
operation, the CUs are exclusively assigned licensed spectrum
chunks from the BSs, while the DUs must share the spectrum
with the CUs.
Here, we formulate a two-sided matching problem between
the CUs and DUs. Each CU and DU starts by building its
preference list by observing the necessary information, e.g.,
the channel condition, the transmission power, and specific
QoS requirements, on the other type of players. Here, the
preferences of CUs over DUs are defined as monetary payment
from the DUs or the incurred interference on CUs. The DUs
build their preferences over CUs based on the channel con-
ditions or achievable transmission rate. A CU-DU matching
is said to be unacceptable if the system’s QoS requirements
is violated. Players that are unacceptable are then removed
from each others preferences. Then, each player (CU or DU)
sorts the acceptable players in the descending order of its
preferences. After setting up the preferences, proper matching
algorithms must be developed to achieve the required system
objectives such as maximizing the throughput. For example,
when using the DA algorithm, as explained in Fig. 2, DUs
will propose to the CUs who, in turn, will accept or reject the
received applications. The complexity of this iterative process
depends on the total number of the acceptable pairs m, which
is O(m) [8].
However, beyond considering a global utility, in some
scenarios, one is interested in optimizing the performance of
one of the two sets of players, such as the DUs. Based on our
work in [15], we proposed the idea of incorporating a form of
“cheating” in the preferences in an effort to improve the DUs’
utilities. Cheating is done by enabling the DUs to smartly
change their preferences, so as to reap more performance
gains. As shown in our result in Fig. 6, the use of such cheating
strategies can improve the DUs’ utility while simultaneously
improving the system utility, compared with a DA algorithm.
In addition, as done in [6], one can extend such D2D models
to cases in which D2D communication must explore, beyond
physical layer parameters, the social ties of the users. Here, as
shown in [6], one can cast the problem as a class II problem
to capture peer effects which reflect how socially connected
are the users who utilize D2D communication with an anchor
device (i.e., used for content distribution or caching by the
BSs). For such a model, one can enhance the DA algorithm
to account for peer effects and show its convergence to a two-
sided stable matching.
D2D is undoubtedly an important application area for
matching theory with a promising set of future problems.
V. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have provided the first comprehensive
tutorial on using matching theory for developing innovative
resource management mechanisms in wireless networks. First,
we have provided the fundamental concepts of matching
theory and discussed a variety of properties that allow the
definition of several classes of matching scenarios. Then, we
proposed three, new, engineering-oriented classes of matching
theory, that can be adopted in wireless networking environ-
ments. For each class, we have developed the basic concepts
and solutions that can be used to address related problems.
We then provided a detailed treatment on how to use such
matching-theoretic tools in specific wireless applications. In a
nutshell, this paper is expected to provide an accessible and
holistic tutorial on the use of new techniques from matching
theory for addressing pertinent problems in emerging wireless
systems.
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